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THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
Tessa McKeown* 
For over 60 years, lawyers and historians have discussed the credibility and repercussions of the 
Nuremberg Trial (1945–1946). The Nuremberg Trial at the International Military Tribunal was 
conducted by the four Allied Powers to try the upper echelon Nazi war criminals following the 
Second World War. The London Charter, drafted by the Allies, outlined the trial procedure to be 
adopted, and provided certain guarantees in an attempt to secure a fair trial for the 22 defendants. 
This article examines the history of fundamental due process rights (recognised in both Continental 
Europe and Common Law jurisdictions) and analyses the extent to which these rights were 
breached at Nuremberg. It argues that the defendants' procedural due process rights were partially 
protected at Nuremberg, although there were gross breaches of particular fundamental due process 
rights. This article further argues that despite the defendants being afforded more rights than they 
could have expected given the circumstances, such breaches significantly compromised the integrity 
of the trial. 
I  INTRODUCTION 
The Allied victors of the Second World War wrote the London Charter (the Charter) 
establishing the International Military Tribunal (IMT) to try the upper echelon Nazi leaders. The 
due process rights of the 22 Nazi defendants were partially protected at Nuremberg, although there 
were gross breaches of particular fundamental rights, which compromised the integrity of the trial. 
However, given the unique historical and political context of the trial and the limited practical 
alternatives available, the Nazi defendants were arguably afforded more due process rights than they 
could have expected. 
The defendants' right to a public trial was upheld at Nuremberg. All of the defendants were 
represented by counsel, though they were deprived of the opportunity to represent themselves. The 
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independence of the Tribunal can be criticised, though arguably this did not detract from its ability 
to remain impartial. The grossest breaches of due process rights lay, first, in the lack of adequate 
time and facilities to prepare and present a defence, and secondly, in the deprivation of the right of 
appeal. These and other fundamental due process rights will be discussed in the context of the main 
Nuremberg Trial at the IMT. 
While the retrospective application of law at Nuremberg is repeatedly criticised by lawyers and 
historians, this issue will not be dealt with in this article. The focus of this article is on the less 
frequently discussed due process rights accorded to the Nazi defendants during the trial itself, and 
the extent to which these rights were breached. 
II  BACKGROUND TO NUREMBERG 
Following the end of World War II, the Allied Powers were faced with the decision of what to 
do with the captured German war criminals. Three courses were open to the Allies: release, 
summary execution or trial.1 The Soviets were in favour of summary execution, an option that 
received initial support from Churchill.2 Opinion surveys carried out in Britain and the United 
States of America indicated that the majority of public opinion was in favour of execution without 
trial of the upper echelon Nazi leaders. 3  Henry L Stimson, United States Secretary of War, 
advocated for a trial, stating that the "moral position" of the Allies would be thrown into question if 
they conformed to Nazi methods and carried out execution without the protection of law.4  
On 8 August 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union (Allies) 
signed the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
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European Axis Powers (London Charter).5 Article 1 of the Charter established the IMT, which was 
to sit at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, Germany. The Allies selected the defendants because 
each was the highest-ranking individual in his area or department. 6 One defendant committed 
suicide; another was considered not fit to stand trial, leaving 22 defendants to be tried.  
The Tribunal was made up of four members: one voting judge selected from each of the four 
Allied powers, and each with an alternate. Lord Justice Lawrence (United Kingdom) was the 
President of the Tribunal. Francis Biddle (United States), Professor Henri Donnedieu de Vabres 
(France) and Major General Iona Nikitchenko (Soviet Union) made up the remainder of the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal's authority was unchallengeable. According to the Tribunal, its jurisdiction 
came from the Charter, which was created by the Allied Powers as a result of its rights and powers 
over the nations that had unconditionally surrendered to the Allies.7 
Article 16 of the Charter aimed to protect the due process rights of the accused. Justice Robert 
Jackson, chief prosecutor for the United States, recognised the importance and necessity of securing 
a just trial for the 22 defendants. In his opening statement he declared:8 
[W]e must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which 
history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as 
well. 
Despite these noble intentions, the existence and protection of the defendants' due process rights at 
Nuremberg is still contested. 
III  DUE PROCESS: THE CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICATION AT 
NUREMBERG 
The concept of due process is based upon equality and basic fairness, the Common Law origins 
of which stem from the Magna Carta,9 and were further developed in the English Bill of Rights 
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1688. While there are some differences between jurisdictions as to exactly what procedural due 
process is comprised of, there is a general consensus as to the basic elements.10  
Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions have different criminal procedures and different 
standards of due process. Common Law states follow an adversarial trial procedure, emphasising 
the equality of arms between the parties, the right to cross-examination and the right to counsel.11 
Equality of arms is the concept that requires both the prosecution and the defence to have a 
reasonable opportunity to present their case at no disadvantage vis-à-vis the other side. Civil Law 
procedure (as used in Continental Europe) is inquisitorial. The focus is on the pretrial phase and 
emphasises judicial participation in the proceedings.12 When drafting the Charter, both systems 
necessarily had to be regarded. Justice Jackson observed the difficulty in this:13 
Members of the legal profession acquire a rather emotional attachment to forms and customs to which 
they are accustomed and frequently entertain a passionate conviction that no unfamiliar procedure can 
be morally right. 
The procedural rules adopted were an amalgamation of Anglo-American and Continental European 
systems, though they were predominantly based on the American model.14 Stimson argued that a 
combination of both systems allowed for and protected the defendants' rights under both.15 This 
compromise allowed the trial to proceed efficiently.16 
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Dallas, 1954) at xxxv. 
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IV  THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
A  History and Development 
A defendant's right to counsel is viewed as one of the most fundamental rights accorded to 
accused people in criminal trials, in both Continental and Common Law jurisdictions. Before the 
19th century in Civil Law jurisdictions, it was generally the judge who examined the evidence, 
requiring little support from the defendant and their counsel.17 During the 19th century, the role of 
the accused developed and thus required the defence to undertake a more active role in proceedings. 
It was during this period that the right to counsel became an important legal right in Civil Law 
jurisdictions.18 English Common Law did not provide a defendant with the right to counsel until 
1836, however this guarantee is now considered one of the most fundamental rights offered to 
criminal law defendants.19 
The right to counsel is viewed as an important component of an accused person's basic due 
process rights.20 This is also true in the international sphere. A defendant's right to consult counsel 
and seek representation ensures that a defendant is treated fairly throughout the proceedings.21 The 
presence of counsel is a means of reducing power imbalances between defendants and the state, and 
of securing the right to equal justice.22  
B  Application and Extent to which the Right was Breached at 
Nuremberg 
Article 16 of the Charter secured the defendants' right to counsel.23 If a defendant failed to 
appoint counsel, the Tribunal would do so for him.24 Only one lawyer was permitted to appear at 
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the trial for any defendant (in absence of special permission from the Tribunal).25 The defendants' 
right to conduct their own defence was expressly provided for in the Charter. However, when 
Rudolf Hess stated that he was actually prepared to do so, this right was ignored.26 All of the 
defendants were represented by counsel.27 
The Tribunal established a secretariat office to manage the trial's administration. British officer, 
Major Neave, served the defendants with the indictment and offered assistance in finding counsel.28 
Neave explained to the defendants their rights under the Charter.29 One month prior to the eve of 
the trial, Neave presented the defendants with a list of 60 suitable lawyers and legal professors to 
select from.30 Alternatively, the defendants were entitled to request counsel of their choosing, who 
then had to be approved by the Tribunal.31 
All chosen counsel were prominent German lawyers and professors. 32 Almost half of the 
defence counsel had Nazi backgrounds – some even "ardent and unrepentant" Nazis.33 Six were in 
fact proven to have been members of the Nazi Party.34 Major General Nikitchenko and Lieutenant 
Colonel Volchkov (the Soviet alternate) voted against the acceptance of these six as counsel, 
however the other Tribunal members outvoted them.35 The Tribunal never rejected those chosen as 
counsel. This leniency is evidence of the Tribunal's efforts to provide the best possible opportunity 
for the defendants to present their defences.  
  
25  "Rules of Procedure for the Trial of the German Major War Criminals 1945" Nuremberg Trial Proceedings 
vol 2, r 2(d). 
26  Werner Maser Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial (translated by Richard Barry, Penguin Books, London, 1977) 
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29  Lord Justice Lawrence "The Nuremberg Trial" (1947) 23 J Intl Aff 151 at 151–152. 
30  Conot, above n 28, at 78; Bradley F Smith Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (Basic Books, Michigan, 
1977) at 82. 
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International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1997) at 30. 
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The Allies covered defence counsel's expenses. They were paid, fed, housed and provided with 
offices and assistants. 36  While some counsel had supported Nazism, others opposed it and 
considered it to blame for all of Germany's present suffering. 37 Despite this, defence counsel 
suffered harassment and disrespect by the German public, press and some Allied staff. Counsel were 
criticised and vilified by reporters of the Nuremberg proceedings.38 Further, defence counsel were 
often treated by Allied staff with the same hostility as the accused, and were made to feel like 
second-class citizens.39  
However, the Judges (particularly Lord Justice Lawrence) went to great lengths to ensure 
defence counsel were respected within the Tribunal and in the media. The Judges recognised that 
without the assistance of defence counsel, a credible trial would have been impossible.40 Lord 
Justice Lawrence made a point of observing, "In the opinion of the Tribunal, defence counsel have 
performed an important public duty in accordance with the high traditions of the legal profession."41 
Lord Justice Lawrence criticised Allied occupation powers for allowing press attacks on defence 
counsel, and stressed that defence counsel were and would remain under the protection of the 
Tribunal.42 The Judges highlighted that further public attacks would not be tolerated by the Court.43 
Faced with such animosity, acting as counsel for the Nazi defendants was no doubt a task of 
considerable difficulty. Defence counsel perceived correctly the odds as against them, and were 
expected to represent their Nazi clients, while not necessarily supporting Nazism themselves. 
Despite this, counsel often presented clever defences for the accused. Otto Kranzbuhler, counsel for 
Grand Admiral Doenitz, was considered one of the sharpest defence lawyers during the trial. 44 
Kranzbuhler crafted a defence by presenting an interrogatory to United States Admiral Nimitz that 
obtained information about United States naval practice. Kranzbuhler used this information to argue 
that Doenitz's actions were comparable to those of the United States Admiral, and consequently 
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were in accordance with war at sea practices and therefore not criminal.45 Kranzbuhler crafted this 
argument in a way that could not be rejected as being a prohibited tu quoque ("you, too") defence. 
This defence was partially successful, and the Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty on count one of the 
indictment. 46  While many of the defence counsel presented well-thought out and researched 
defences, their unfamiliarity with proceedings meant that they were often at a significant 
disadvantage during the trial. 
All German lawyers, defence counsel were acquainted with German legal procedure, and not the 
Anglo-American trial procedure that prevailed. Defence counsel had to quickly familiarise 
themselves with the Anglo-American accusatory model. 47 Given that there was only a 30 day 
period between the serving of the indictments and the beginning of the trial, counsel would have 
been primarily focused on looking through evidence and building defences, leaving little to no time 
to get accustomed to trial procedure. This disadvantaged defence counsel during the trial, and they 
were criticised for being "clumsy and unimaginative".48 First, they were unprepared during cross-
examination. 49  Secondly, they were often unfamiliar with how to handle evidence from 
interrogatories, as demonstrated in an awkward exchange between Lord Justice Lawrence and 
Alfred Thoma, counsel for Alfred Rosenberg.50 
Despite its express protection in the Charter, the defendants were denied the right to act as their 
own counsel during the trial. When Hess stated that he was prepared to act as his own counsel, this 
right was ignored. In denying Hess this right, the prosecution was arguably doing him a favour. 
Hess was exhibiting signs of amnesia and insanity, and any effort made to argue his own case would 
likely have been compromised, and ultimately ineffective. However, the opportunity to argue one's 
own case is inherent in the right to counsel. Even when taking into consideration Hess's unusual 
personal circumstances, this deprivation was a direct breach of the defendants' due process rights. 
Therefore, the defendants' right to counsel was partly upheld at the IMT. Defendants were 
entitled to representation by counsel of their choosing, and counsel were often clever with defences. 
However, defendants were denied the right to act as their own counsel. Further, counsel's ability to 
act effectively was partly compromised due to their unfamiliarity with the Anglo-American trial 
procedure, and the harassment they suffered from the public and press. 
  
45  Nuremberg Trial Proceedings (8 May 1946) vol 13 at 230–245. 
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V THE RIGHT TO A FAIR AND PUBLIC HEARING BY AN 
INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL COURT 
A History and Development 
A defendant's right to a fair trial is at the heart of criminal proceedings.51 While the concept of a 
"fair trial" often encompasses all due process rights, this article will focus on the more specific 
interpretation of "fairness" as the notion of equality.52  
The right to a public trial is a fundamental right of due process. However, in some jurisdictions, 
this right is not absolute.53 In 19th century Continental Europe and England, the requirement of a 
public hearing was widely contested. By the end of the century, it was a fundamental right in most 
European legal systems.54 The right to a public hearing has many rationales. First, public inspection 
and criticism of the process provides a sense of legitimacy. 55 Secondly, it operates as public 
denunciation of the conduct. Thirdly, it strengthens public confidence in the system by 
demonstrating the ability of authorities to hold people to account and punish them for their 
actions.56  
The concept of an independent trial stems from Montesquieu's 18th century separation of 
powers theory.57 The legislature, executive and judiciary must remain separate to provide checks 
and balances and prevent abuses of power. Judicial independence is thus of great importance in the 
context of an international tribunal. This concept should therefore have been borne in mind when 
appointing tribunal members. 
Judges must be impartial in the sense that they must have no preconceived opinions of the 
defendants and have no stake in the outcome of the trial. Nor should they act in a way that promotes 
the interests of one party at the expense of the other. A tribunal must operate in absence of prejudice 
and bias.58  
  
51  Zahar and Sluiter, above n 19, at 292. 
52  Pascal Chenivesse and Christopher J Piranio "What Price Justice? On the Evolving Notion of 'Right to Fair 
Trial' from Nuremberg to The Hague" (2011) 24 CRIA 403 at 404; David Feldman (ed) English Public Law 
(Oxford University Press, London, 2004) at 678–679. 
53  Gora, above n 10, at 107. 
54  Summers, above n 17, at 39. 
55  Summers, above n 17, at 43; Thurman Arnold "Due Process in Trials" (1955) 300 Annals Am Acad Pol and 
Soc Sci 123 at 124–126. 
56  Summers, above n 17, at 44. 
57  Charles-Louis de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws 1748 (translated by Thomas 
Nugent, D Appleton and Company, New York, 1900). 
58  Feldman, above n 52, at 679. 
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B Fair Hearing at Nuremberg 
While the right to a fair hearing encompasses many of the rights discussed, it is an important 
stand-alone right in terms of basic equality, particularly in the context of a post-war ad hoc tribunal 
such as Nuremberg. Article 16 of the Charter protected the defendants' right to a fair trial by 
ensuring certain legal procedures were followed. The Allied drafters believed that the inclusion of 
this Article would "do justice to the defendants" and protect their fair trial rights.59 However, art 16 
related to "fairness" and due process rights more broadly, and thus this Article will not be the focus 
of this part. Throughout this part, the concept of fairness will be narrowly interpreted to mean 
equality. 
There is much debate surrounding whether the Nazi defendants received a "fair" trial at 
Nuremberg. The majority of historical and legal opinion is that given the circumstances, the 
defendants were given a fair trial.60 However, some critics argue that the trial was unfair.61 As the 
concept of fairness is broad and often flexible, such assessments must be approached with caution. 
Evaluating fairness specifically in terms of equality, this article argues that while inequalities 
existed between the prosecution and defence, the efforts of the Judges operated to mitigate these 
inequalities.  
The equality of the trial regarding the legal procedure adopted can be questioned. As previously 
mentioned, the trial ran largely according to Anglo-American legal proceedings – a method 
unfamiliar to the defendants and to their counsel. This meant that the defence was at a distinct 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the prosecution. Defence counsel were forced to quickly learn and adapt to 
the unfamiliar Anglo-American procedure. There was thus no equality between the prosecution and 
the defence regarding the trial procedure adopted. In fact, the reliance on documentary evidence 
reflected Continental European legal procedure. However, this actually operated to disadvantage the 
defence because of the sheer quantity of documents the Allies submitted as evidence.62 Given the 
comparatively short time frame the defence had to deal with the mass of documents and the fewer 
  
59  Krieg, above n 7, at 7. 
60  Maley, above n 38, at 9; HT King "The Judgments and Legacy of Nuremberg" (1997) 22 Yale J Intl L 213 
at 221; Jennifer K Elsea Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military and International Courts 
(Federation of American Scientists, CRS Report for Congress RL31262, 18 September 2006) at 7; Stimson, 
above n 1; Carl Haensel "The Nuremberg Trials Revisited" (1963–1964) 13 DePaul L Rev 248 at 258; Jan 
Schnitzer "The Nuremberg Justice Trial 1947: Vengeance of the Victors?" (LLM Thesis, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2010); Orend, above n 27, at 171; Smith, above n 30, at 22–23; Lukman Harees 
The Mirage of Dignity on the Highways of Human 'Progress': The Bystanders Perspective (AuthorHouse, 
Bloomington, 2012) at 346; Wallach, above n 14, at 852; May and Wierda, above n 14, at 727; Fichtelberg, 
above n 1, at 6. 
61  Krieg, above n 7. 
62  Smith, above n 30, at 83. 
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resources the defence had at their disposal to do so, there was no real equality of arms between the 
parties. 
However, the Tribunal attempted to mitigate this inequality by allowing defence counsel to 
discuss the case with the Tribunal. British alternate, Norman Birkett, argued that it was highly 
unusual and possibly "very bad" for a court to discuss the case with defence counsel.63 Biddle 
countered:64 
I don't feel that at all. The great criticism of this trial is going to be that the defendants had very little 
time to prepare, were not properly represented, that their lawyers labored under impossible difficulties, 
that they were confused when they went on. 
It is therefore important that the Judges recognised the substantial inequality that existed between 
the prosecution and the defence. The procedures they enacted in attempt to mitigate this inequality 
are further evidence of the Tribunal's determination to secure a fair trial for the defendants. 
The major obstacle in preventing an equality of arms and thus a fair trial was the one-sidedness 
of the charges. The Nuremberg Trial is widely criticised for not allowing the tu quoque defence, 
which meant that the Allies could not be charged with the offences they were charging the 
defendants with, despite having committed them. To prevent Allied acts being called into question, 
the prosecution based the charges solely on German documentation. 65  The defendants were 
prohibited from presenting evidence that implicated the Allies in any war crimes, crimes against 
humanity or crimes against the peace. 66 This can be contrasted from Kranzbuhler's framing of 
Admiral Doenitz's defence as mentioned above. The absence of this tu quoque defence significantly 
compromised the equality (and therefore fairness) of the trial. 
Therefore, the primary barrier preventing an equality of arms between the parties (and thus a fair 
trial) was that the tu quoque defence was unavailable to the defendants. While significant 
inequalities existed between the prosecution and the defence in terms of the style of legal procedure 
adopted during the trial, the procedures enacted by the Tribunal and the efforts of the Judges 
(particularly Lord Justice Lawrence) operated to mitigate these inequalities.  
  
63  Conot, above n 28, at 86. 
64  At 86. 
65  Smith, above n 30, at 102. 
66  May and Wierda, above n 14, at 761. 
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C Public Hearing at Nuremberg 
The Nuremberg trials at the IMT were public hearings. In constructing the Palace of Justice to 
hold the trial, a gallery was built to hold over 250 visitors and members of the press.67 The IMT had 
hundreds of staff who were able to attend the trials, and press and private citizens were given the 
opportunity to observe the proceedings from the visitor's gallery.68 The hearings were open to the 
German public, and international reporters and visitors had unrestricted access. 69 The Charter 
required that copies of the proceedings be made available in multiple languages.70 
Given that the prosecution relied predominantly on documentary evidence, the audience was 
largely comprised of counsel, onlookers and correspondents. Encounters with victims and witnesses 
were therefore unlikely.71 
Public interest in the trial peaked at the beginning and the end of the trial; during the months in 
between the gallery was half empty.72 The public sessions of the Tribunal continued throughout the 
trial, however the Tribunal met "behind the scenes" from June until September 1946.73 This does 
not detract from the public nature of the hearings, as private deliberations between judges are 
expected. Therefore, the defendants' right to a public hearing was upheld. 
D Independent Tribunal at Nuremberg 
The independence of the Nuremberg Tribunal has been widely criticised. Independence in terms 
of Montesquieu's separation of powers theory is not usually a concern in international tribunals, 
because there is no identifiable executive, legislative or judicial body.74 The IMT was an ad hoc 
tribunal, and was governed by one specific Charter drawn up by the Allied Powers for the purpose 
of prosecuting the Nazi defendants, who were to be tried before a tribunal of judges appointed by 
the Allies. Thus, the concept of independence will be examined in terms of judicial independence. It 
  
67  United States Holocaust Memorial Museum "The Nuremberg Courtroom" (2013) Holocaust Encyclopedia 
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68  United States Holocaust Memorial Museum "Witnessing History" (2013) Holocaust Museum 
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is therefore important that the Tribunal, as the "judiciary" and the body interpreting the law, 
maintained independence from the lawmakers. 
The Tribunal at Nuremberg was not independent because there was a substantial overlap 
between lawmaker, prosecutor and judge. Justice Jackson was the primary United States 
representative in London involved in drafting the Charter. He subsequently played a part in 
selecting the defendants to be tried, and became the chief United States prosecutor during the trial. 
Sir Maxwell Fyfe acted in a similar capacity for the United Kingdom. Major General Nikitchenko 
conducted negotiations for the Soviet Union in regards to the drafting of the Charter, and later sat as 
the Soviet Union's primary voting Judge on the Tribunal Bench. Robert Falco was the principal 
French legislator of the Charter, and subsequently sat as the French alternate on the Tribunal.75 
These overlaps are fundamentally inconsistent with the notion of judicial independence. 
Further, not only were there overlaps in the administration of justice at Nuremberg, the law 
makers, prosecutors and Tribunal Judges were all from the victorious Allied nations. The defence 
had strong objections against this:76 
[T]he defense consider it their duty to point out at this juncture another peculiarity of this Trial which 
departs from the commonly recognised principles of modern jurisprudence. This one party to the 
proceedings is all in one: creator of the statute of the Tribunal and of the rules of law, prosecutor and 
judge.  
Defence counsel requested that the Court obtain the expert opinion of internationally recognised 
international law scholars about the legal foundations of the IMT. The Tribunal rejected this 
application.77 No neutral states or any of the Axis Powers were involved in the drafting of the 
Charter or sat on the Tribunal Bench. Critics argue that the presence of a neutral nation (such as 
Switzerland or Sweden) would have enhanced the Tribunal's credibility.78 However, many neutral 
states often affiliated more with either the Allies or the Axis Powers. In light of this, and the post-
war political climate, it was arguably not practicable to have a Tribunal composed of any states but 
those of the victorious Allied Powers.  
Therefore, the overlap between the drafters of the Charter, the prosecutors and the Judges, and 
the fact that all three parts were comprised solely of individuals from the victorious Allied powers 
considerably compromised the judicial independence of the Tribunal at Nuremberg. However, it is 
important to recognise that the concepts of independence and impartiality are not synonymous. 
Independence is primarily concerned with the Tribunal's compilation, whereas impartiality looks to 
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its operation. Consequently, it is possible for one to exist without the other. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the independence of the Tribunal is not crucial so long as the Tribunal is impartial.79 
E Impartial Tribunal at Nuremberg 
The Nuremberg Tribunal mostly managed to secure an atmosphere of impartiality. However, the 
Tribunal's impartiality can be questioned regarding the four victors on the Bench, and also due to 
existing Tribunal member prejudice. At the opening session of the trial, the four Judges professed, 
"I solemnly declare that I will exercise all my powers and duties as a member of the International 
Military Tribunal honourably, impartially, and conscientiously."80 While great efforts were made to 
honour this declaration, and such efforts were often successful, the impartiality of the Tribunal 
remains a contentious element of the trial. 
The victorious nations of the War sat on the Tribunal to judge the defeated. United States 
Senator Robert Taft declared, "The trial of the vanquished by the victors cannot be impartial."81 The 
Allies suffered tremendous losses during the war at the hands of the Germans. The argument is that 
the victors would not be well equipped to judge the German war leaders because they would not be 
free from "hatred, passion and national prejudice". 82 As citizens of the victorious nations, the 
Judges occasionally interacted with members of the prosecution. During the trial, Soviet prosecutor 
Andrei Vyshinsky came to Nuremberg to sit with the prosecution. While he was visiting, a party 
was held in his honour, which the prosecution and Tribunal Judges attended.83 Such interaction 
could have made impartiality difficult. 
Further, Soviet Judge Major General Nikitchenko openly expressed prejudice toward the 
defendants. During the London negotiations, Nikitchenko revealed his belief that the purpose of the 
trial was to determine the appropriate punishment to be given to the Nazi defendants, whose guilt 
had already been determined.84 Such sentiment is indicative of a bias held towards the defendants, 
and demonstrates that Major General Nikitchenko had adopted a preconceived notion of guilt before 
having heard any of the evidence. If Major General Nikitchenko was swayed by this preconception, 
the credibility and impartiality of the Tribunal would have been significantly compromised. 
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However, Major General Nikitchenko was not a main power on the Bench, and he did not carry as 
significant an influence (relative to Lord Justice Lawrence and Francis Biddle). There is nothing to 
suggest that his pretrial disposition led him to judge the guilt of the defendants on anything other 
than evidence presented by both sides during the trial.85 With hindsight, the impartiality of the 
Tribunal may have been better secured had Nikitchenko not gone on to sit as one of the four voting 
Judges. 
The Tribunal's impartiality can further be questioned in relation to the evidential rules of the 
Charter. Article 19 of the Charter provided that the Tribunal was not bound by strict rules of 
evidence. Article 21 provided that the Tribunal did not require proof of facts of common 
knowledge. What exactly could be considered "facts of common knowledge" was not further 
explained in the Charter. In the context of war, the Tribunal's ability to objectively assess such 
documents to determine "facts of common knowledge" can be seriously questioned.86  
The perceived impartiality of the Tribunal is largely due to the efforts of Lord Justice Lawrence 
to make it so. Lord Justice Lawrence ruled the Tribunal from the Bench, and was above all focused 
on ruling fairly and impartially. 87  Historical and legal consensus remains that Lord Justice 
Lawrence created the distinct impression and atmosphere of impartiality on the Tribunal Bench.88 
This was a conscious effort on Lord Justice Lawrence's behalf:89 
If Lawrence was thought to have erred in giving too much scope to a defendant, then he would have felt 
he had erred on the right side; better to shoulder some personal criticism than have the whole trial 
dismissed as partial to the prosecution. 
Lord Justice Lawrence was determined to ensure the trial remained impartial, insisting on 
evenhandedness throughout.90 It has been argued that Lord Justice Lawrence in fact "bent over 
backwards" to ensure the defendants were given an equal opportunity to present their defences.91 
This received much criticism from the prosecution, and also from other members of the Tribunal. 92 
Lord Justice Lawrence's dedication to remaining impartial was evident during cross-examination. 
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Justice Jackson's cross-examination of Reich Marshal Goering is one of the most discussed 
moments of the trial. Jackson was noticeably irritated by Goering's lengthy responses, and argued 
that he was unnecessarily prolonging the trial. Jackson requested that Goering be limited to "yes/no" 
answers to the questions. Lord Justice Lawrence intervened on behalf of Goering, stating:93 
Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks the witness ought to be allowed to make what explanation he 
thinks right … after having given a direct answer to any question, he may make a short explanation; and 
that he is not to be confined simply to making direct answers 'yes' or 'no'. 
Goering proceeded to speak relatively uninterrupted for nine days. This cross-examination was 
valuable insofar as it revealed the Tribunal's impartiality. 94 Arguably, Lord Justice Lawrence's 
dedication to remaining impartial throughout the trial was the most successful means of securing the 
defendants' due process rights. His impartiality operated to relieve the suspicions of defence counsel 
that the Tribunal and Charter were established solely for the purpose of convicting the defendants.95 
Francis Biddle also strived to remain impartial. Justice Jackson argued that the Court should not 
set up its own administrative body, but should work hand-in-hand with the prosecution 
administration. Biddle was strongly opposed to this suggestion, arguing that to maintain 
independence and impartiality, it was imperative that the Tribunal ran a separate administration. 
Justice Jackson disagreed, stating that this was not an ordinary trial, and remnants of independence 
and impartiality had been dismissed when Nikitchenko had exercised a role in drafting the Charter 
and later sat on the Tribunal Bench. As Biddle had acted in a similar dual capacity, he was thus even 
more determined to remain impartial.96   
Critics have argued that Lord Justice Lawrence almost over-compensated in ensuring 
impartiality on the part of the Tribunal. Few Germans doubted the impartiality and objectivity of the 
Judges. In fact, it has been argued that the majority was of the opinion that objectivity was carried 
too far.97 Following Justice Jackson's unsuccessful cross-examination of Goering, Jackson arranged 
a private meeting with Biddle, during which he accused the members of the Tribunal of always 
ruling in favour of the defendants.98 This allegation suggests that Jackson was concerned about the 
Judges over-compensating in an effort to remain impartial. 
  
93  Nuremberg Trial Proceedings (20 March 1946) vol 9 at 511. 
94  Tusa and Tusa, above n 89, at 291. 
95  Maley, above n 38, at 6. 
96  Smith, above n 30, at 77. 
97  Lueders, above n 82, at 135. 
98  Smith, above n 30, at 109. 
 PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AT THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 125  
Further, the Tribunal produced three acquittals. For a guilty verdict, three out of four votes were 
required. This suggests that most of the Judges did not have preconceptions regarding the guilt of 
the defendants, and ruled solely on the evidence put before them. Such a lack of prejudice in the 
judgments is further evidence of the Tribunal's impartiality. 
Therefore, the efforts of Lord Justice Lawrence contributed to the impartiality of the Tribunal. 
However, its impartiality can be questioned insofar as the preconceptions of Major General 
Nikitchenko and the evidentiary leniencies are concerned. 
VI THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE TIME AND FACILITIES TO 
PREPARE AND PRESENT A DEFENCE 
A History and Development 
The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare and present a defence is a central right 
accorded to criminal defendants in both Anglo-American and Continental European jurisdictions. 
The fundamental right of audi alteram partem provides that no defendant shall be judged without 
the opportunity to present their case and respond to the evidence given against them.99 This is 
consistent with the above principle of equality of arms. 
What is considered to be "adequate" time to prepare a defence is very case specific, and it is 
impossible to set a universally applicable standard.100 The post-war context and ad hoc Tribunal 
could arguably be factors influencing what is considered to be "adequate" time. "Facilities" broadly 
encompasses four elements: the right of access to the case file, the right of discovery, the discovery 
of "hidden material" and investigation by the defence.101 In theory, the prosecution is under an 
obligation to disclose all material evidence that is relevant to the defendant's case.102 
American rules of evidence are stricter and more extensive than European evidential law. Most 
Continental jurisdictions have flexible rules of evidence, and operate an "inquisitorial" system.103 
An inquisitorial system places "singular importance on ascertaining the truth at trial", and thus 
"erects few evidentiary barriers that restrict the information the Judge can consider in determining 
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guilt".104 This can be contrasted with the Anglo-American adversarial process. Hearsay proof is 
accepted under German law.105 
B Application and Extent to which the Right was Breached at 
Nuremberg 
The limited time granted to the defendants to prepare their defence and the barriers they faced in 
accessing the necessary evidence to prepare those defences is arguably one of the grossest breaches 
of due process rights at Nuremberg. However, the defendants' right to present their defences and the 
ability to cross-examine witnesses were generally upheld, with the exception of ex parte witness 
affidavits. 
The Charter had loose evidentiary rules, which were more akin to Continental European legal 
procedure. As discussed, art 19 of the Charter provided that the Tribunal was not to be bound by 
technical rules of evidence, and was at liberty to admit any evidence which it deemed to have 
"probative value". Article 16 provided safeguards to the defendants. Under the Charter, the 
defendants had to be served with the indictment in German at a reasonable time before the trial, and 
had the right to access a translation of the trial. 106 The defendants had the right to give any 
explanation relevant to the charges made against him.107 The defendants had the right to counsel, 
and through that counsel had the right to present evidence at the trial to support his defence, and 
also had the right to cross-examine any witnesses called by the prosecution.108 
The prosecution had in their possession an enormous quantity of German documentation to use 
as evidence in the trial. A group of military personnel established by the Allies were tasked with 
seizing and preserving all material German documents, records and archives in preparation for the 
trial.109 By November 1945, the prosecution had over 17,000 pages of oral evidence, and over 
22,000 pages of written evidence. 110  The prosecution subsequently submitted approximately 
12,000–15,000 pages to the Tribunal.111 
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The defendants were granted 30 days of preparation from the serving of the indictment to the 
opening of the trial. 30 days was inadequate, given the "documentary avalanche"112 of evidence that 
the prosecution had gathered leading up to the trial that had to be examined by defence counsel, the 
time the defence counsel had to spend getting acquainted with the unfamiliar procedural system, and 
the barriers faced by the defence counsel in accessing evidence crucial to the defence case. 30 days 
of preparation inevitably became 21, when 12 defendants had not secured counsel three weeks prior 
to the trial.113 
One of the grossest deprivations of due process rights was the defendants' lack of access to 
evidence held by the prosecution prior to the trial. This is a direct denial of the right to adequate 
facilities to prepare a defence. The prosecution had thoroughly searched the German archives, and 
had seized all evidence relevant to the case. Remaining documents (of which there were few) were 
left for the defence.114 Such evidence was gathered and held in limited access document centres. 
Even some of the most crucial and exonerating material held by the prosecution was not made 
available to the defence. 115 Occupying authorities barred the access of defence counsel to the 
necessary document archives, and they were unable to make the investigations necessary to form 
their defences.116 Even while the trial was in progress, access to material documentation remained 
difficult for the defence.117 
The defence also faced difficulties accessing books and information from overseas. It was 
impossible for the defence to access a copy of the Foreign Minister of Romania and Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union's article detailing the events leading up to the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union.118 Similarly, the defence was denied access to a copy of General George Marshall's final 
war report, which was available in Allied newspapers.119 Arguably, it would have been possible for 
the defendants to somehow gain access to this report. However, this demonstrates the additional 
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obstacles defence counsel had to overcome when preparing the defence case, and the reluctance of 
the prosecution to provide the defence with the necessary evidence. In one instance, the prosecution 
disclosed documents to the press which they had neglected to provide translated copies of to the 
defence. Biddle and Lord Justice Lawrence viewed this as a direct breach of Court orders.120 
The lack of access to documents was often as a result of the deliberate withholding of evidence 
by the prosecution. Initially, Justice Jackson indicated the willingness of the prosecution to make 
evidence available to the defence. When the Tribunal directed him to do so, he was reluctant to 
assist the defence.121 Before the defence could access any documentary evidence, the prosecution 
ordered that counsel must first state what they were looking for and then make a specific request. 
No indexes or summaries were provided; therefore without knowing what the documents contained, 
defence counsel were unable to make any sort of specific request.122 When defence counsel did 
request copies of documents from the prosecution, they had often "disappeared", or were made 
available in insufficient quantities, incomplete, not translated and days too late.123 During the trial, 
Justice Jackson suggested that the defence should not be permitted to read its documents into the 
records, and instead should be limited to submitting the document books to the Judges. Dr Dix 
(counsel for Hjalmar Schacht) addressed the Court in response:124 
I cannot consider it just and I cannot consider it fair if the prosecution had the right, for months, not only 
once but sometimes repeatedly and often, to bring their evidence to the knowledge of the public… The 
defence counsel must and would consider it a severe and intolerable limitation of the defence, if, 
contrary to the procedure exercised so far by the prosecution, it were deprived of the possibility of 
presenting, in its turn, at least the relevant parts of its own documentary evidence to the Tribunal 
verbally and with comments. 
The Judges ruled against Jackson and in favour of the defendants.125 
As a result of the flexible evidential rules, the Tribunal accepted ex parte witness affidavits from 
the prosecution, depriving the defendants the right of cross-examination. While the Charter 
expressly gave defendants the right of cross-examination, it did not prevent the prosecution from 
introducing ex parte affidavits. Often, the people who wrote the affidavits were unavailable to 
testify during the trial, denying the defence the right to cross-examine any witnesses.126 Witnesses 
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were often unwilling to personally testify before the defendants and the Tribunal, or were practically 
unable to (many were in jail and others lived a great distance from Nuremberg).127 The Tribunal 
accepted such affidavits despite objections from defence counsel.128 Depriving the defendants this 
right to cross-examine witnesses is a direct denial of their rights to present a defence, and thus a 
gross breach of their due process rights. 
Further, the defendants were faced with language and translation difficulties, which exacerbated 
the time pressures in preparing the defence case. When the defence requested copies of 
documentation from the prosecution, they were often provided only in English. 129  Once the 
documents were eventually translated, errors were found.130  
Lord Justice Lawrence acknowledged the weaknesses of the defence in terms of the time and 
facilities available to prepare their cases, and made some efforts to mitigate these inadequacies. On 
22 November 1945, assistant trial counsel for the United States, Frank Wallis, was discussing 
sections of the indictment. Lord Justice Lawrence stopped Wallis, and ordered that before he be 
allowed to continue, he must make available translated copies to the defence counsel.131 Further, Dr 
Dix addressed the Tribunal regarding the difficulties they were facing in terms of having adequate 
time and facilities to prepare their defences, given the unfamiliar Anglo-American procedures. Lord 
Justice Lawrence ruled in favour of the defence. The Tribunal ordered that to be accepted into 
evidence, every prosecution document must go through a four-language translation system, and the 
process must give defence counsel adequate time to object.132 
However, the Tribunal members had the authority to refuse to accept defence evidence, which 
infringed on their rights to present a defence. Defence counsel were under the obligation to inform 
the Judges of any evidence to be presented by the defence. Under the Charter, the Judges could 
refuse to accept the evidence into the trial if they ruled it did not have practical "relevance".133 This 
was a wide discretion given to the Judges as a result of the flexible evidential rules, leaving the rules 
open to abuse, ultimately to the disadvantage of the defence. While Lord Justice Lawrence was 
thorough in explaining this procedure to the defence, it did little to help them.134 
  
127  Utley, above n 116.  
128  Michael P Scharf "Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg?" (1995) 149 Mil L Rev 65 at 69. 
129  Maser, above n 26, at 98; Kranzbuhler, above n 2, at 442–443. 
130  Laternser, above n 111, at 481. 
131  Nuremberg Trial Proceedings (23 November 1945) vol 2 at 214. 
132  Smith, above n 30, at 84. 
133  Article 20; Utley, above n 116; Davidson, above n 31, at 32. 
134  Davidson, above n 31, at 32. 
130 (2014) 45 VUWLR  
The lack of time granted to the defendants to prepare a defence, the lack of access to necessary 
documentary evidence, the translation difficulties, abuse of flexible evidentiary rules and acceptance 
of ex parte affidavits in conjunction operated to deprive the Nuremberg defendants of the adequate 
time and facilities to prepare and present a defence. 
VII THE RIGHT OF APPEAL TO A HIGHER COURT OR 
TRIBUNAL 
A History and Development 
The right to appeal a case to a higher court or tribunal is recognised and protected in both 
Continental and Common Law jurisdictions. The right of appeal has a complex history. Criminal 
appeal rights in Continental Europe can be traced back to Roman times.135 In contrast, the modern 
right of criminal appeal was not formally recognised in Anglo-American jurisdictions until the turn 
of the 20th century.136 The right of appeal has thus developed over time, and has only recently been 
recognised as a fundamental due process right. However, it is often only the right to a limited 
appeal. In the United States and England, the appealed case is not looked at completely anew.137 
The broad right of appeal is not present in the United States Bill of Rights.138 
The right of appeal is considered fundamental because it provides an opportunity for potential 
errors made in the first instance to be corrected. Particularly in a post-war international context, the 
right of appeal is a crucial means of mitigating potential prejudice and bias.  
Appeal rights are a means of preventing miscarriages of justice and securing the legitimacy of 
the criminal justice process.139 Appeal processes also operate to achieve consistency in trial courts, 
though arguably this is inapplicable in the context of ad hoc international military courts without a 
jury. 
B Application and Extent to which the Right was Breached at 
Nuremberg 
Article 26 of the Charter provided that the judgment of the Tribunal as to guilt or innocence 
shall give reasons, and shall be final and not subject to appeal or review. The right of appeal was 
altogether denied: there was no appellate instance to neither affirm nor reject the judgments or 
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sentences. In the interests of time and expense, the Allies desired a full and final judgment. 140 
Deprivation of this fundamental right to have the Nuremberg judgments evaluated at a higher 
appellate level has been considered one of the most "procedurally dubious" and controversial 
elements of the trial.141 
Given the unique historical and political context, an appellate instance was not entirely 
practicable. Justice Jackson and the other Allies agreed that in the context of a trial of a "tiny 
number of notorious men who had dominated the world stage for a dozen years", an appellate 
Tribunal was impractical and unnecessary. 142  Realistically, it is difficult to see where any 
reasonable appeal could have been made. 
However, the defendants in the subsequent Nuremberg trials were given rights of appeal, 
although these rights were limited. Arguably, this was a direct result of the criticism voiced in 
response to the IMT defendants receiving no appeal rights. The defendants were permitted to appeal 
to the United States Military Governor.143 They were given the right to seek clemency and pardons 
based on: first, a review of the evidence against them; secondly, any legal issues; and thirdly, 
personal circumstances. 144  While often viewed as political mechanisms, these "appellate" 
procedures benefited a large portion of defendants.145  
The right of appeal is vigorously protected by contemporary international standards.146 Critics 
accept that it would have added complexity to the trials, but that "justice demands it".147 Given that 
the Tribunal permitted trial in absentia, in conjunction with the ability of the Tribunal to award a 
death sentence,148 the fact that the defendants had no right of appeal was particularly unjust in these 
circumstances. The potential partiality and lack of independence of the Judges was unable to be 
mitigated by appeal to a neutral authority, or even another legal figure of the Allied nations. While 
there is no knowing whether the convictions or sentences would have been overturned or even 
lessened, the absence of such an opportunity greatly diminishes the chance of the Nuremberg trial 
being judged as just. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
The Nuremberg Trial at the IMT was the first international tribunal established for the 
punishment of war crimes, and has provided a model for later ad hoc tribunals and the more 
permanent International Criminal Court. While the trial has often been praised for laying the 
foundations for subsequent international criminal tribunals, Nuremberg's adherence to procedural 
due process can be extensively criticised.  
Given the circumstances of the trial and the limited practical alternatives available, the Nazi 
defendants were arguably afforded more due process rights than they could have expected. Justice 
Jackson aptly recognised this at the close of the trial:149 
The future will never have to ask, with misgiving, what could the Nazis have said in their favour. 
History will know that whatever could be said, they were allowed to say. They have been given the kind 
of a Trial which they, in the days of their pomp and power, never gave to any man. 
The Tribunal partially protected the defendants' right to be represented by counsel. However, 
notwithstanding its express protection in the Charter, Hess was directly denied the right to act as his 
own counsel, in breach of this fundamental right. The Tribunal protected the defendants' right to a 
public hearing by ensuring that all hearings were conducted publically.  The Tribunal at Nuremberg 
was far from independent, though due to the efforts of Lord Justice Lawrence, this did not detract 
substantially from its ability to remain impartial. Similarly, the efforts of the Judges to mitigate the 
inequalities between the prosecution and the defence are direct evidence of the Tribunal's 
determination to secure an equal (and thus fair) trial for the defendants. 
The grossest breach of the defendants' due process rights lay in the deprivation of adequate time 
and facilities to prepare and present a defence. The lack of time granted to the defendants to prepare 
a defence, the lack of access to necessary documentary evidence, the translation difficulties, abuse 
of flexible evidentiary rules and acceptance of ex parte witness affidavits in conjunction operated to 
deprive the Nuremberg defendants of this fundamental due process right. 
The second major breach of due process was the inability of the defendants to appeal the 
judgments and sentences to a higher appellate body. The fact that the Tribunal (whose independence 
can be genuinely questioned) allowed defendants to be tried in absentia, in addition to the ability of 
the Tribunal to award the death sentence made the lack of appellate instance particularly unjust. 
The due process rights of the 22 defendants were partially protected at Nuremberg. The right to 
represent oneself, the right to properly prepare and present a defence and the right of appeal are 
pivotal due process rights that are recognised and protected internationally; however, they were not 
protected at Nuremberg. These gross breaches of fundamental due process rights operated to 
compromise the integrity of the trial. 
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